We describe the mobile agent paradigm which is becoming increasingly popular for network-centric programming, and compare it with earlier paradigms for distributed computing from which it has evolved. The design of mobile agent systems requires the resolution of several system-level issues, such as the provision of code mobility, object naming, portability, scalability, and a range of security issues that go hand-in-hand with mobile code. Agent programming requires suitable languages and programming models that can support code mobility, and runtime systems that provide some fundamental primitives for the creation, migration and management of agents. We discuss these requirements and describe several mobile agent systems that illustrate di erent approaches taken by designers to address the problems.
Introduction
Interest in network-centric programming and applications has surged in recent months due to the exponential growth of the Internet user-base and the widespread popularity of the Worldwide Web. In response to this, new techniques, languages, and paradigms have evolved which facilitate the creation of such applications. Perhaps the most promising among the new paradigms is the use of mobile agents. This paper discusses the mobile agent paradigm and surveys its requirements in terms of language-level features and system-level support. We also examine several mobile agent systems to illustrate how they address these issues.
Mobile Agents: In a broad sense, an agent is any program that acts on behalf of a (human) user. A mobile agent then is a program which represents a user in a computer network, and is capable of migrating autonomously from node to node, to perform some computation on behalf of the user. Its tasks are determined by the agent application, and can range from online shopping to real-time device control to distributed scienti c computing. Applications can inject mobile agents into a network, allowing them to roam the network either on a predetermined path, or one that the agents themselves determine based on dynamically gathered information. Having accomplished their goals, the agents may return to their \home site" in order to report their results to the user.
Historical Perspective
Traditionally, distributed applications have relied on the client{server paradigm in which client and server processes communicate either through message-passing or remote procedure calls (RPC). This communications model is usually synchronous, i.e., the client suspends itself after sending a request to the server, waiting for the results of the call. An alternative architecture called Remote Evaluation (REV) was proposed by Stamos and Gi ord 12] in 1990. In REV, the client, instead of invoking a remote procedure, sends its own procedure code to a server, and requests the server to execute it and return the results. Earlier systems like R2D2 14] and Chorus 1] introduced the concept of active messages that could migrate from node to node, carrying program code to be executed at these nodes. A more generic concept is a mobile object, which encapsulates data along with the set of operations on that data, and which can be transported from one network node to another. Emerald 7] was an early example of a system that provided object mobility, but it was limited to homogeneous local area networks. The mobile agent paradigm has evolved from these antecedents. Figure 1 illustrates how it di ers from RPC and REV. In RPC, data is transmitted between the client and server in both directions. In REV, code is sent from the client to the server, and data is returned. In contrast, a mobile agent is a program (encapsulating code, data and context) sent by a client to a server. Unlike a procedure call, it does not have to return its results to the client. It could migrate to other servers, transmit information back to its origin, or migrate back to the client if appropriate. It thus has more autonomy than a simple procedure call.
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Telescript 15], which was developed by General Magic in the early 1990s, was the rst system expressly designed to support mobile agents in commercial applications. It was followed by several research systems such as Tacoma 6] and Agent Tcl 4] , in which agents are written using script languages. The emergence of Java, with its support for mobile code, led to heightened research activity in this area. Aglets 8], Voyager 10], Concordia 2] and Ajanta 9] are examples of Java-based mobile agent systems. See the sidebar for web references for these and other prominent mobile agent projects.
Applications of Mobile Agents
Several advantages of the mobile agent paradigm, in comparison with RPC and message-passing, have been identi ed 5] . These stem from the capability of the paradigm to reduce network usage, increase asynchrony between clients and servers, to add client-speci ed functionality to servers, and to introduce concurrency. We now discuss these capabilities and identify several applications that can exploit them.
Information search and ltering applications often download and process large amounts of server-resident information, and generate comparatively small amounts of result data. Instead, using mobile agents which execute on server machines and access server data without using the network, the bandwidth requirements can be reduced. Some applications involve repeated client-server interactions, which require either maintaining a network connection over an extended period, or making several separate requests. If mobile agents are used instead, the client does not have to maintain a network connection while its agents access and process information. This permits increased asynchrony between the client and server. This feature is especially useful for mobile computers which typically have low-bandwidth, unreliable connections to the network, and are often switched o to save on power consumption. Also, the repeated client-server interactions are reduced to two agent-transfer operations, thus reducing the frequency of network usage as well.
In client-server applications, servers typically provide a public interface with a xed set of primitives. Clients may need higher-level functionality composed of these primitives, and their requirements can change over time. Rather than modifying the server interface to support such requirements for every client, a client can maintain its own interface at the server node, using a mobile agent. This has the added advantage of reducing the number of network-based interactions required. The same feature can be exploited by service providers to dynamically enhance server capabilities. Mobile agents can also be viewed as a mechanism for introducing parallel activities, since they execute concurrently. A client can decompose its task among multiple agents for providing parallelism or fault tolerance.
The mobile agent paradigm can be exploited in a variety of ways, ranging from low-level system administration tasks to middleware to user-level applications. An example of a system-level application is in real-time control 5] . If the application uses RPCs to control a device, it may be di cult (if not impossible) to guarantee that it will meet the real-time deadlines associated with the device. This is because communication delays are not accurately predictable, unless the underlying network provides quality of service guarantees. Instead, the application can send an agent to the device and control the device locally, resulting in better predictability. Other examples of system-level applications include network maintenance, testing and fault diagnosis, installing and upgrading software on remote machines.
Mobile agents can be useful in building middleware services such as active message systems, distributed collaboration systems, etc. An active mail message is a program that interacts with its recipient using a multimedia interface, and adapts the interaction session based on the recipient's responses. The mobile agent paradigm is well suited to this type of application, since it can carry a sender-de ned session protocol along with the multimedia message.
An example of a user-level application would be an electronic marketplace. Vendors can set up online shops, with products, services or information for sale. A customer's agent would carry a shopping list along with a set of preferences, visit various sellers, nd the best deal based on the preferences, and purchase the product using digital forms of cash. This application imposes a broad spectrum of requirements on mobile agent systems. Apart from mobility, it needs mechanisms for restricted resource access, secure electronic commerce, protection of agent data, robustness and user control over roving agents. In subsequent sections, we use this application as an example to illustrate various design issues encountered in mobile agent systems.
Applications that need to monitor events on remote machines { such as whether a particular stock's price has fallen below a threshold { also bene t from mobile agents, since agents need not use the network for polling. Instead of periodically downloading stock quote data, an agent can be sent to the quotes service to monitor the stock price. The agent can inform the user when a speci ed event occurs.
System-level Issues
A mobile agent system is an infrastructure that implements the agent paradigm. The main challenges in designing this infrastructure are discussed in this section. Each machine which intends to play host to mobile agents must provide a protected agent execution environment | an agent server. The agent server is responsible for executing agent code and providing primitive operations to agent programmers, such as those which allow agents to migrate, communicate, access host resources, etc. A logical network of agent servers implements the mobile agent system. Agent servers can be specialized to provide application-speci c services. For example, in an electronic marketplace, each vendor runs an agent server that provides a shop-front interface to customers' agents. The shop-front includes product descriptions, price lists, etc. and mechanisms for agents to look up such catalogs and order products.
Many useful agent applications will require Internet-wide access to resources. Users will need to dispatch agents from their laptops, irrespective of their physical location. Hence, the mechanisms used in the agent infrastructure should scale up to wide-area networks. Agents can execute on many di erent hosts during their lifetimes. In general, we cannot assume that these hosts have identical architectures or even that they run the same operating system. Thus, agents must be programmed in a language that is machine-independent and widely available.
Agent Mobility
The primary identifying characteristic of mobile agents is their ability to autonomously migrate from host to host. Thus, support for agent mobility is a fundamental requirement of the agent infrastructure. An agent can request its host server to transport it to some remote destination. The agent server must then deactivate the agent, capture its state, and transmit it to the server at the remote host. The destination server must restore the agent state and reactivate it at the remote host, thus completing the migration.
The state of an agent includes all its data, as well as the execution state of its thread. At the lowest level, this is represented by its execution context and call stack. If this can be captured and transmitted along with the agent, the destination server can reactivate the thread at precisely the point where it requested the migration. This can be useful for transparent load-balancing, or fault-tolerant programs. An alternative is to capture execution state at a higher level, in terms of application-de ned agent data. The agent code can then direct the control ow appropriately when the state is restored at the destination. However, this only captures execution state at a coarse granularity (e.g. function-level), in contrast to the instruction-level state provided by the thread context. Most agent systems execute agents using commonly available virtual machines or language environments, which do not usually provide thread-level state capture. The agent system developer could modify these virtual machines for this purpose, but this renders the system incompatible with standard installations of those virtual machines. Since mobile agents are autonomous, migration only occurs under explicit programmer control, and thus state capture at arbitrary points is usually unnecessary. Most current systems therefore rely on coarse-grained execution state capture to maintain portability.
Another issue in implementing agent mobility is the transfer of agent code. One possibility is for the agent to carry all its code as it migrates. This allows the agent to run on any server which can execute the code. Some systems do not transfer any code at all, and require that the agent's code be pre-installed on the destination server. In a third approach, the agent does not carry any code but contains a reference to its code base { a server that provides its code upon request. During the agent's execution, if it needs to use some code that is not already installed on its current server, the server can contact the code base and download the required code. This is sometimes referred to as code-on-demand.
Naming
Various entities in the system, such as agents, agent servers, resources, users etc. need to be assigned names which can uniquely identify them. An agent should be uniquely named, so that its owner can communicate with or control it while it travels on its itinerary. For example, a user may need to contact his/her shopper agent to update some preferences it is carrying. Agent servers need names so that an agent can specify its desired destination when it migrates. Some namespaces may be common to di erent entities { e.g., agents and agent servers may share a namespace. This allows agents to uniformly request either migration to a particular server or co-location with another agent with which it needs to communicate.
Next, the system must provide a mechanism to nd the current location of an entity, given its name. This process is called name resolution. The names assigned to entities may be location-dependent, which allows easier implementation of name resolution. Systems like Agent Tcl, Aglets and Tacoma use such names, based on hostnames and port numbers, and resolve them using DNS. In such systems, when an agent migrates, its name would change. This makes the application's task of tracking its agents more cumbersome. Therefore, it is desirable to provide location-transparent names at the application level. This can be done in two ways. The rst is to provide local proxies for remote entities, which encapsulate their current location. The system updates this location information when the entity moves, thus providing location-transparency at the application level. For example, Voyager uses this approach for agent names, although servers are identi ed using DNS names. The alternative is to use global, location-independent names that do not change when the entity is relocated. This requires the provision of a name service, which maps a symbolic name to the current location of the named entity. In Ajanta, such global names are used uniformly for all types of entities. Moreover, some systems (e.g. Concordia, Voyager) can interoperate with the CORBA model for locating and accessing remote objects.
Security Issues
The introduction of mobile code in a network raises several security issues. In a completely closed local area network { contained entirely within one organization { it is possible to trust all machines and the software installed on them. Users may be willing to allow arbitrary agent programs to execute on their machines, and their agents to execute on arbitrary machines. However in an open network such as the Internet, it is entirely possible that the agent and server belong to di erent administrative domains. In such cases, they will have much lower levels of mutual trust. Servers are exposed to the risk of system penetration by malicious agents, analogous to viruses and Trojan horses. Malicious (or just buggy) agents can cause inordinate consumption of resources, thereby denying their use to other agents and legitimate users of the server. The security-related requirements can be categorized as follows:
Privacy and integrity of the agent Authentication of agents and servers Authorization and access control Metering/charging/payment mechanisms
Privacy and Integrity
Agents carry their own code and data along with them as they traverse the network. Parts of their state may be sensitive, and may need to be kept secret when the agent travels on the network. For example, a shopper agent may carry its owner's credit card number, or personal preferences. The agent transport protocol needs to provide privacy, to prevent eavesdroppers from acquiring sensitive information. Also, an agent may not trust all servers equally. We need a mechanism to selectively reveal di erent portions of the agent state to di erent servers. For example, a shopping agent may solicit quotations from various vendors. To ensure fairness, one vendor's quotation must not be readable or modi able by others.
A security breach could result in the modi cation of the agent's code as it traverses the network. As Farmer et al. argue 3], it is generally considered impossible to prevent such modi cation (especially by hostile servers), but it is possible to detect it. Thus we need some means of verifying that an agent's code is unaltered during transit across an untrusted network or after visiting an untrusted server. On the other hand, an agent's state typically needs to be updated during its journey so that it can collect information from servers, for example. We cannot assume that all servers visited are benign, and thus we cannot guarantee that the agent's state will not be maliciously modi ed. However we can provide mechanisms that allow such tampering to be detected.
Cryptographic mechanisms can be used to provide a secure communication facility, which an agent can use to communicate with its home site, or servers can use to transport agents safely across untrusted networks. Selective revealing of state can be accomplished by encrypting di erent parts of the state with di erent public keys belonging to the servers allowed to access those parts of the state. Mechanisms such as seals or message digests can be used to detect any tampering of agent code.
Authentication
When an agent attempts to transport itself to a remote server, the server needs to ascertain the identity of the agent's owner, in order to decide what rights and privileges the agent will be given in the server's environment. A vendor's server needs to know the visiting agent's identity to determine which user to charge for services rendered. Conversely, when an agent migrates to a server, it needs some assurance of the identity of the server itself before it reveals any of its sensitive data to that server.
Digital signature systems have been used to develop mutual authentication schemes 11]. These need to be adapted to the mobile agent domain and integrated into agent transport protocols. In order to verify signatures, agents and servers need to reliably know the signing entity's public key. This requires a key certi cation infrastructure. Public keys certi ed by trusted agencies can be posted in network-wide directories that can be accessed by agents and servers. This infrastructure could be integrated with the name resolution service, so that a name lookup can return a public key in addition to the object location. In general, agents cannot carry secret/private keys for authentication purposes, since this leaves them vulnerable to malicious hosts.
Authorization and Access Control
Authorization is the granting of speci c resource access rights to speci c principals (such as owners of agents). Some principals are more trusted than others, and thus their agents can be granted less restrictive access. This involves specifying policies for granting access to resources, based either on identities of principals, their roles in an organization, or their security classi cations. Additional restrictions may be placed on an agent's rights by its owner, e.g. to limit the damage caused by buggy code. These can be encoded into the agent's state and enforced by the server.
The agent server needs to protect its resources from unauthorized access. Therefore, in addition to authorization mechanisms, it is necessary to provide some enforcement mechanism which implements the access control policy. The authorization and enforcement mechanisms can operate at di erent levels -e.g. at the level of individual objects (\the agent is granted read/write access to a particular le"), or at a site-wide level (\the agent can create any network connections"), or something in between (\the agent can use 1MB of disk space, and create connections only to hosts in the foo.com domain"). The infrastructure must provide convenient means of encoding such rules. Traditional mechanisms like access control lists, capabilities, security labels, etc. need to be adapted for this purpose. These mechanisms do not take into account, for example, the length of time for which an entity may access a resource. This is necessary in mobile agent systems, to prevent \denial of service" attacks by agents which acquire but never release resources, thus preventing other agents from using them. Similarly, a malicious server could repeatedly retransmit an agent to another server, thus tying up its resources. Such retransmissions must therefore be detected and foiled.
Metering and Charging Mechanisms
When agents travel on a network, they consume resources such as CPU time, disk space, etc. at di erent servers. These servers may legitimately expect to be reimbursed monetarily for providing such resources. Also, agents may access value added services, information, etc. provided by other agents, which could also expect payment in return. In our marketplace example, users can send agents to conduct purchases on their behalf. Thus, mechanisms are needed so that an agent can carry digital cash, and use it to pay for resources used by it. Operating system level support may be needed for metering of resource usage, such as the CPU time used by an agent or the amount of disk space it needed during its visit. Alternatively, a server may implement more coarse-grained charging { e.g. a xed charge could be levied per visit by an agent. Subscription based services are also possible, wherein a server would allow an incoming agent only if its owner had already paid a monthly fee.
The security features supported by selected mobile agent systems are summarized in Table 1. 3 Language-level Issues
Agent Programming Languages and Models
Since an agent may execute on heterogeneous machines with varying operating system environments, the portability of agent code is a prime requirement. Therefore, most agent systems are based on interpreted programming languages 13], which provide portable virtual machines for executing agent code. Another important criterion in selecting an agent language is safety. Languages that support type checking, encapsulation, and restricted memory access are particularly suitable for implementing protected servers.
Several systems use scripting languages such as Tcl, Python, and Perl for coding agents. These languages are relatively simple and allow rapid prototyping for moderately sized agent programs. They have mature interpreter environments which permit e cient, high-level access to local resources and operating system facilities. However, script programs often su er from poor modularization, encapsulation, and performance. Some agent systems therefore use object-oriented languages such as Java, Telescript or Obliq 13] . Agents are de ned as rst-class objects which encapsulate their state as well as code, and the system provides support for object migration in the network. Such systems o er the natural advantages of object-orientation in building agent-based applications. Complex agent programs are easier to write and maintain using object-oriented languages. A few systems have also used interpreted versions of traditional procedural languages like C, for Mobile agent systems di er signi cantly in the programming model used for coding agents. In some cases, the agent program is merely a script, often with little or no ow control. In others, the script language (e.g. Python) borrows features from object-oriented programming and provides extensive support for procedural ow control. Some systems model the agent-based application as a set of distributed interacting objects, each having its own thread of control and thus able to migrate autonomously across the network. Others use a callback-based programming model in which the system signals certain events at di erent times in the agent's life-cycle. The agent is then programmed as a set of event-handling procedures.
Programming Primitives
In this section, we identify the primitive language-level operations required by programmers implementing agent-based applications. We categorize agent programming primitives into: Basic agent management: creation, dispatching, cloning and migration. Agent-to-agent communication and synchronization. Agent monitoring and control: status queries, recall and termination of agents. Fault tolerance: checkpointing, exception handling, audit trails, etc. Security-related: encryption, signing, data sealing, etc.
Basic Agent Management Primitives
Agent Creation and Dispatch: An agent creation primitive allows the programmer to create instances of agents, thereby partitioning the application's task among its roving components. This also introduces concurrency into the system. Agent creation involves the submission of the entity to be treated as an agent, System Naming
Agent Migration
Telescript Location-dependent (based on DNS). Both absolute (go) and relative (meet) migration. Tacoma Location-dependent (based on DNS). Single primitive (meet) supports both absolute and relative migration. Agent Tcl Location-dependent name based on Only absolute, using agent jump primitive. The DNS, and optional symbolic alias. agent fork primitive sends a clone agent instead. Aglets URLs based on DNS names. Only absolute, using the dispatch primitive. Supports Itinerary abstraction. Voyager Location-independent global ID, as Single primitive (moveTo) supports both absolute well as local proxy. and relative migration. Concordia Location-dependent (based on DNS). Only absolute, based on the contents of agent's Directory service available. Itinerary. Ajanta Location-independent global names. Single primitive (go) supports both absolute and relative migration. Supports Itinerary abstraction. Table 2 : Agent Mobility Support to the system. This could be a single procedure to be evaluated remotely (as in REV), a script, or a languagelevel object. In object-oriented systems, an agent is usually created by instantiating a class which provides the agent abstraction. The system can inspect the submitted code to ensure that it conforms to the relevant protocols and doesn't violate security policy. Based on the identity of the agent creator, a set of credentials for the agent may also be generated at this time. These are transmitted as part of the agent, to allow other entities to identify it unambiguously. Thus a shopping agent's credentials would allow vendors to charge the appropriate user for items sold or services rendered.
A newly created agent is just passive code, since it has not yet been assigned a thread to execute it. For activation, it must be dispatched to a speci c agent server. The server authenticates the incoming agent using its credentials and determines the privileges to be granted to it. It then assigns a thread to execute the agent code.
A variant of the creation primitive allows an agent to create identical copies of itself, which can execute in parallel with it, and potentially visit other hosts performing the same task as their creator. Aglets supports such cloning of agents. Another variant is forking of agents (supported by Agent Tcl, for example), in which the newly created agent retains a parent-child relationship with its creator. This allows programmers to create agents that inherit their ownership, privileges, etc. from their parents.
Agent Migration: During the course of its execution, an agent program may determine that it needs to visit another site on the network. To achieve this, it invokes a migration primitive. The agent server must suspend the agent's execution, capture its state and transmit it to the requested destination. The server at the destination can then receive the agent state and activate it after the appropriate security checks are passed. The destination speci ed by the agent can either be absolute, i.e., the name of the server it needs to migrate to, or relative, i.e. the name of another agent or resource it needs to co-locate with. Most systems provide absolute migration primitives. Relative migration is supported by systems like Telescript, Tacoma and Ajanta. Some systems build upon their migration primitives to provide higher-level abstractions, such as an itinerary, which contains a list of servers to visit, and the corresponding code to execute at those locations. Table 2 summarizes the basic mobility support provided by the seven mobile agent systems surveyed.
Agent Communication and Synchronization
In order to accomplish useful work, agents often need to communicate and/or synchronize with each other { e.g. a user may dispatch several agents to query vendors' catalogs in parallel. These agents need to collab-oratively identify the best deal available. Suitable inter-agent communication primitives must therefore be made available. Inter-agent communication can be established using di erent mechanisms. One approach is to provide message-passing primitives, which allow agents to either send asynchronous datagram-style messages, or to set up stream-based connections to each other. Aglets only supports datagrams (which can be tagged with string values) whereas Agent Tcl provides both types of messages.
Method invocation is another approach for communication in object-based systems. If two agent objects are co-located on a server, they can be provided references to each other, using which they invoke operations. For example, Ajanta and Telescript allow agents to acquire safe references to co-located agents. For agents that are not co-located, remote method invocation can be provided. Voyager supports several variants, such as synchronous, one-way and future-reply invocations.
Collective communication primitives can be useful in applications that use groups of agents for collaborative tasks. Such primitives can be used to communicate with or within an agent group. Other group coordination mechanisms such as barriers can be built upon these primitives. Concordia supports group communication that is limited to event delivery. Voyager uses a hierarchical object grouping mechanism for the delivery of invocation messages to groups. Most other systems however do not support agent grouping.
Communication can also be implemented using shared data. For example, in Ajanta, two or more agents can gain access to a shared object, which can then be used to exchange information. Similarly in Tacoma, each server provides a cabinet in which visiting agents can store data, allowing them to share state even if they are not simultaneously present at the server. Concordia uses a shared object to provide a barrier for agent groups.
Another metaphor for agent communication is event-signalling. Events are usually implemented as asynchronous messages. An agent may request the system to notify it when certain events of interest occur, such as agent creation, arrivals, departures, checkpointing, etc. This is referred to as the publish-subscribe model of event delivery. Another model is to provide broadcast of events to all agents in a group. Concordia and Voyager provide such primitives.
Agent Monitoring and Control
An agent's parent application may need to monitor the agent's status while it executes on a remote host. If exceptions or errors occur during the agent's execution, the application may need to terminate the agent. This involves tracking the current location of the agent and requesting its host server to kill it. Ajanta provides a terminate primitive for this purpose.
Similarly, the agent owner may simply recall its agent back to its home site and allow it to continue executing there. This is equivalent to forcing the agent to execute a migrate call to its home site. The owner can use an event mechanism to signal the agent, or raise an exception remotely. The agent's event/exception handler can respond by migrating home. Aglets and Ajanta provide a retract operation using which, e.g. a user can recall his/her agents from the electronic mall if they run out of digital cash.
This capability of remotely terminating and recalling agents raises security issues { only an agent's owner should have the authority to terminate it. Thus, some authentication functions need to be built into these primitives, i.e. the system must ensure that the entity attempting to control the agent is indeed its owner, or has been authorized by the owner to do so. Ajanta is the only system which performs such authentication.
In order to determine whether it needs to recall/abort an agent, the owner must be able to query the agent's status from time to time. Such queries can be answered by the agent's host server, which keeps track of status information (such as active/inactive status, error conditions and resource consumption) for all agents executing on its site. If the owner needs to make a more application-speci c query which can only be answered by the agent, it simply communicates with the agent via the usual agent communication 
Primitives for Fault Tolerance
A checkpoint primitive creates a representation of the agent's state which can be stored in non-volatile memory. If an agent (or its host node/server) crashes, the owner can initiate a recovery process. It can determine the agent's last known checkpoint, and request the server to restart the agent from that state. In addition to the checkpoints themselves, agent servers can also maintain an audit trail so as to allow the owner to trace the agent's progress along its itinerary, and potentially determine the cause of the crash. Systems such as Tacoma, Voyager and Concordia support checkpointing for fault tolerance.
If an agent encounters an exception that it cannot handle, its server can take suitable actions to assist the application with recovery. For example, it can send a noti cation to the agent's owner, which can recall the agent or terminate it. Alternatively, the server can simply transfer the agent back to the owner. This allows the owner to inspect the agent's state locally and restart it with appropriately corrected state. Ajanta supports the latter approach.
Security-related Primitives
Since agents may pass through untrusted hosts or networks, the agent programmer needs primitive operations for protecting sensitive data. This includes primitives for encryption and decryption which protect the privacy of data, as well as message sealing or message digests using which any tampering of the code or data can be detected. Digital signatures and signature veri cation primitives may also be needed to establish authenticated communication channels. If public-key cryptography is used, the programmer needs to have a secure key-pair generation primitive, as well as a key certi cation infrastructure. Primitives related to the encoding, allocation and disbursement of digital cash may also be required. An agent's identity, its certi ed public key, digital cash allocation, constraints on its access rights, etc. can be encoded into its credentials by its owner using suitable operations provided by the system. None of the mobile agent systems surveyed support such primitives.
Examples of Mobile Agent Systems
Several academic and industrial research groups are currently investigating and building mobile agent systems. In this section, we give an overview of a representative subset of these, listed in approximately chronological order of their development.
Telescript
Telescript, developed by General Magic, includes an object-oriented, type-safe language for agent programming. Telescript servers, which are called places, o er services, usually by installing stationary agents to interact with visiting agents. Agents use the go primitive for absolute migration to places, speci ed using DNS-based hostnames. The system captures execution state at the thread level, so the agent resumes operation immediately after the go statement. Relative migration is also possible using the meet primitive. Co-located agents can invoke each other's methods for communication. An event-signalling facility is also available.
Telescript has signi cant support for security and access control. Each agent and place has an associated authority, which is the principal responsible for it. A place can query an incoming agent's authority, and potentially deny entry to the agent or restrict its access rights. The agent is issued a permit, which encodes its access rights, resource consumption quotas, etc. The system terminates agents that exceed their quotas, and raises exceptions when they attempt unauthorized operations.
Telescript was not commercially successful, primarily because it required programmers to learn a completely new language. General Magic has now shelved the Telescript project and embarked on a similar, Java-based system called Odyssey that uses the same design framework. In common with most other Javabased systems, it lacks thread-level state capture.
Tacoma
Tacoma is a joint project of the University of Troms (Norway), and Cornell University. Agents are written in Tcl, although they can technically carry scripts written in other languages too. An agent's state must be explicitly stored in folders, which are aggregated into briefcases. An agent is created by packing the program into a distinguished folder called CODE. Next, its intended host's name is stored in the HOST folder. Absolute migration to this destination is requested using the meet primitive. The meet command names among its parameters, an agent on the destination host that is capable of executing the incoming code (such as the system-supplied ag tcl which executes Tcl scripts). A briefcase containing the CODE, HOST and other application-de ned folders is sent to this agent. The system does not capture thread-level state when an agent migrates. Therefore, the ag tcl script restarts the agent program at the destination.
Agents can also use the meet primitive to communicate by co-locating and exchanging briefcases. Both synchronous and asynchronous communication are supported. An alternative communication mechanism is the use of cabinets, which are immobile repositories for shared state. Agents can store application-speci c data in cabinets, which can then be accessed by other agents. No security mechanisms are implemented. For fault tolerance, Tacoma uses checkpointing and provides rear-guard agents for tracking mobile agents as they migrate.
Agent Tcl
Agent Tcl, developed at Dartmouth College, allows Tcl scripts to migrate between servers that support agent execution, communication, status queries and non-volatile storage. A modi ed Tcl interpreter is used to execute the scripts, and it allows the capture of execution state at the thread level. When an agent migrates, its entire source code, data and execution state is transferred. Migration is absolute, and the destination is speci ed using a location-dependent name. It is also possible to clone an agent and dispatch it to the desired server. Agents have location-dependent identi ers based on DNS hostnames, which therefore change upon migration. Inter-agent communication is accomplished either by exchanging messages or setting up a stream connection. Event signalling primitives are available, but events are currently identical to messages.
Agent Tcl uses the Safe Tcl execution environment to provide restricted resource access. It ensures that agents cannot execute dangerous operations without the appropriate security mediation. The system maintains access control lists at a coarse granularity { all agents arriving from a particular machine are subjected to the same access rules. Agent Tcl calls upon an external program (PGP) to perform authentication checks when necessary, and for encrypting data in transit. However, cryptographic primitives are not available to agent programmers.
Aglets
Aglets is a Java-based system developed by IBM. Agents { which are called aglets in this system { migrate between agent servers (called aglet contexts) located on di erent network hosts. A distinguishing feature of Aglets is its callback-based programming model. The system invokes speci c methods on the agent when certain events in its life-cycle occur. For example, when an agent arrives at a server, its onArrival method is automatically invoked. The programmer implements an agent class by inheriting default implementations of these callback methods from the Aglet class, and overriding them with application-speci c code.
Agent migration is absolute, since it requires specifying location-dependent URLs for destination servers. Mobility is implemented using Java's object serialization, and thread-level execution state is not captured. When an agent is reactivated at its destination, its run method is invoked. The programmer must implement further control ow in this method. Agents are shielded by proxy objects, which provide language-level protection as well as location transparency. Message-passing is the only mode of communication supported { aglets cannot invoke each others' methods. Messages are tagged objects, and can be synchronous, one-way, or future-reply. The system provides a retract primitive that recalls an aglet to the caller's server. There is, however, no access control on this primitive. Aglets currently have limited security support; however a more comprehensive authorization framework is being developed 8].
Voyager
This is a Java-based agent system developed by ObjectSpace. A novel feature of Voyager is a utility called vcc which takes any Java class and creates a remotely-accessible equivalent, called a virtual class. An instance of a virtual class can be created on a remote host, resulting in a virtual reference that provides locationindependent access to the instance. This mechanism is used for implementing agents.
An agent is assigned a globally unique identi er, and an optional symbolic name during object construction. A name service is available, which can locate the agent, given its identi er or name. The virtual class provides a moveTo primitive which allows the agent to migrate to the desired location. The destination is speci ed either using the server's DNS hostname and port number, or as a virtual reference to another object with which the agent wishes to be co-located. Execution state is not captured at the thread level, but the moveTo call speci es a particular method, which is executed when the migration is complete. A forwarder object remains in the original location, and ensures that attempts to contact the agent at that site are redirected to its new location.
Agent communication is possible via method invocation on virtual references. Agents can make synchronous, one-way, or future-reply type invocations. Multicasting is also possible, since agents can be aggregated hierarchically into groups. A simple checkpointing facility has also been implemented.
Concordia
Concordia, developed by Mitsubishi Electric, supports mobile agents written in Java. In common with most Java-based systems, it provides agent mobility using Java's serialization and class loading mechanisms, and does not capture execution state at the thread level. Each agent object is associated with a separate Itinerary object, which speci es the agent's migration path (using DNS hostnames) and the methods to be executed at each host.
Concordia has extensive support for agent communication, providing for asynchronous event signalling as well as a specialized group collaboration mechanism. It also addresses fault tolerance requirements via an object persistence mechanism that is used for reliable agent transfer, and can be used by agents or servers to create checkpoints for recovery purposes. Agent state is protected during transit, as well as in persistent stores, using encryption protocols. Servers can protect their resources using statically-speci ed access control lists based on user identities. Each agent is associated with a particular user, and carries a one-way hash of that user's password. It is not clear how this hash is securely bound to a speci c agent. Also, this mechanism only applies to closed systems, since each agent server must have access to a global password le for verifying the agent's password.
Ajanta
This is a Java-based system developed at the University of Minnesota. Ajanta provides agent mobility using Java's serialization for state capture. Thus, thread-level execution state is not captured. Agent code is loaded on demand, from an agent-speci ed server. These transmissions of agent code and state are encrypted and authenticated using public-key protocols. Absolute and relative migration are supported uniformly, and a name service is used to translate global location-independent names to network addresses. The name service also supports a public-key infrastructure.
In Ajanta, an agent is executed in an isolated protection domain, to prevent any interference by other agents. Server resources are protected by encapsulating them in proxy objects, which are created dynamically and customized for speci c client agents. The same mechanism can be used to allow secure inter-agent communication via method invocation. Communication across the network is also possible using remote method invocation. Authenticated control functions allow applications to recall or terminate their remote agents at any time. Ajanta also addresses the problem of protecting agent state from malicious servers. It provides cryptographic mechanisms using which an agent's owner can secure parts of the agent's state and detect any subsequent tampering. Agents can also keep parts of their state private, and selectively reveal certain objects to speci c servers.
Conclusions
We have described the mobile agent paradigm and discussed its requirements in terms of system and languagelevel support. Di erent approaches taken by designers to address these issues were identi ed. The choice of programming model varies from script-based agents, useful for quickly automating simple tasks, to objectoriented agents which are better suited for more complex applications that can bene t from modularity and type safety. The demise of a technically impressive system like Telescript also indicates that popular general-purpose languages and programming models in the Internet domain are more likely to succeed than special-purpose ones like Telescript.
The major obstacle preventing the widespread acceptance of the mobile agent paradigm is the security problems it raises. These include the potential for system penetration by malicious agents, as well as the converse problem of exposure of agents to malicious servers. We nd that no current system solves these security problems satisfactorily, and thus mobile agent security remains an open research area. Ad hoc integration of security mechanisms into the mobile agent framework is unlikely to work; therefore a design that integrates security into the basic agent infrastructure would be preferable.
Thus far, designers have paid little attention to application-level issues such as the ease of agent programming, control and management of agents, dynamic discovery of resources, etc. Literature on the use of basic templates for composing agent itineraries is only just starting to appear. Yellow pages services with standardized interfaces will be necessary to allow user agents to dynamically locate the resources they need. Most current systems require the programmer to know beforehand the network addresses of these resources. Uniform, location-independent resource naming schemes will help simplify the programmer's task. As larger and more complex systems of roving agents are deployed, programmers will need reliable control primitives for starting, stopping and issuing commands to agents. The agent system itself will have to incorporate robustness and fault tolerance mechanisms to allow such applications to operate over unreliable networks. Very little work has been done so far in quantifying the performance tradeo s of the mobile agent paradigm. In summary, we nd that mobile agent systems are yet to reach maturity, and more work is needed especially to address security and robustness concerns.
